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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Anno. § 
78A-4-103(2)(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court properly exercised its discretion by dismissing the 
action below for failure to prosecute where Plaintiffs engaged in a pattern 
of delay by refusing to provide initial disclosures despite court order to 
do so? 
2. Whether the trial court erred in finding that Plaintiffs did not provide the 
initial disclosures required by Utah R. Civ. P. 26 and court order? 
3. Whether Plaintiffs can raise for the first time on appeal the issue of 
Defendant's purported failure to respond to discovery requests? 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The standard of review of the lower court's order dismissing Plaintiffs' case for 
failure to prosecute is abuse of discretion. PDC Consulting, Inc. v. Porter, 2008 
UT App 372,15,196 P.3d 626. (Issue 1). On the other hand, the lower court's 
finding that Plaintiffs failed to provide initial disclosures must be upheld unless 
this Court determines that the finding was clearly erroneous. Chen v. Stewart, 
2004 UT 82,119,100 P.3d 1177. (Issue 2). With respect to the third issue, no 
standard of review applies because Plaintiffs failed to raise the matter below and 
5 
therefore waived it. Brookside Mobile Home Park, Ltd. v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, 1 
14,48P.3d968. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, RULES, AND 
REGULATIONS 
Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) and (2), set forth in the Addendum hereto. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 41(b), which states in pertinent part: 
(b) Involuntary dismissal; effect thereof. For failure of the plaintiff to 
prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order of court, a defendant may 
move for dismissal of an action or of any claim against him... . Unless the court 
in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and 
any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of 
jurisdiction or for improper venue or for lack of an indispensable party, operates as 
an adjudication upon the merits. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On September 4, 2008, Plaintiffs Jay and Kathy Slaughter filed suit in the 
court below against Defendant Leo Anderson DBA Complete Landscape and 
Sprinkler for alleged breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing, and infliction of emotional distress. (R. at 1-7). Despite the passage 
of over fifteen months, Plaintiffs failed to provide their initial disclosures, even 
after the court ordered them to do so. (R. at 49, 83-85,94-98). As a result, on 
December 15, 2009, the court entered an order dismissing the case with prejudice 
for failure to prosecute. (R. at 83-85). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Plaintiffs filed suit against Defendant on September 4, 2008. (R. at 1-9). 
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Defendant filed his Answer on October 9,200&. (R. at 10-14). 
On November 12, 2008, Defendant filed Certificates of Service for his 
Initial Disclosures and his First Set of Interrogatories, Request for 
Production of Documents and Requests for Admission to Plaintiffs. (R. 
at 15-18). 
On January 20, 2009, Defendant's counsel sent a letter to Plaintiffs' 
counsel expressing concern that Plaintiffs had not yet provided initial 
disclosures. (R. at 33-34). 
On February 14,2009, Defendant's counsel again wrote to Plaintiffs' 
counsel and asked when Plaintiffs would provide initial disclosures. (R. 
at 38-39). 
On March 25, 2009, Defendant's counsel sent yet another letter to 
Plaintiffs' counsel stating that Plaintiffs had not yet provided initial 
disclosures. (R. at 41). 
On June 23, 2009, over eight months after Defendant filed his Answer, 
he filed a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute and supporting 
memorandum, based in part upon Plaintiffs' failure to provide initial 
disclosures. (R. at 23-41). 
On July 15,2009, Plaintiffs filed their Responses to Defendant's Motion 
to Dismiss but did not attach any initial disclosures. (R. at 45-46). 
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9. On August 24, 2009, the trial court conducted a telephone conference 
with attorneys for both parties in which the court ordered that Plaintiffs 
file initial disclosures within 10 days. Plaintiffs' counsel agreed to do so. 
The court also stated that Plaintiffs' case would be dismissed if they did 
not comply with the order. (R. at 49, 94-98). 
10. On September 9, 2009, Defendant's counsel sent a letter to Plaintiffs' 
counsel reminding him that Plaintiffs had not provided initial disclosures 
as required by the court's order. (R. at 57). 
11. On September 21,2009, Defendant filed a Supplemental Memorandum 
in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute and 
Request to Submit for Decision, informing the court that Plaintiffs still 
had not provided initial disclosures. (R. at 50-57). 
12. On September 24,2009, Plaintiffs filed their Objections to Defendant's 
Request to Submit for Decision, once again failing to attach initial 
disclosures. (R. at 58-60). Instead, Plaintiffs filed copies of their prior 
responses to discovery requests, claiming that those responses contained 
all of the information that initial disclosures would have contained. (R. at 
61-78). 
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13. Defendant's counsel sent a proposed Order of Dismissal to Plaintiff s 
counsel, in response to which Plaintiffs filed an objection on December 
3,2009. (R.at79). 
14. On December 14, 2009, Defendant filed another Request to Submit for 
Decision. (R. at 80-82). 
15. On December 15, 2009, the trial court entered an Order of Dismissal with 
Prejudice under Utah R. Civ. P. 41(b), finding that Plaintiffs had failed to 
provide initial disclosures as required by Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a) and the 
court's August 24,2009 Order. (R. at 83-85). 
16. On January 12, 2010, Plaintiffs filed their Notice of Appeal. (R. at 86). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court properly exercised its broad discretion in dismissing 
Plaintiffs' case for failure to prosecute. Despite fifteen months elapsing from the 
time they filed their complaint until dismissal, Plaintiffs never provided initial 
disclosures, even after the court ordered them to do so. Defendant, on the other 
hand, served his initial disclosures within a month of filing his answer, as well as 
making several attempts to get Plaintiffs to provide their initial disclosures. 
Defendant also propounded discovery requests early in the case. Defendant was 
inconvenienced and incurred additional costs as a result of Plaintiffs' repeated 
failure to provide initial disclosures. Although Plaintiffs will not receive a remedy 
9 
for their alleged claims because of the dismissal, they had ample opportunity to 
pursue those claims but abused that opportunity. They refused to produce one of 
the first documents required in a case—initial disclosures. The lower court properly 
dismissed Plaintiffs' case based upon their failure to move forward in accordance 
with the civil rules and the directions of the court. 
Encompassed within the lower court's order of dismissal was a finding that 
Plaintiffs failed to provide initial disclosures. That finding was correct. Nowhere 
in the entire Record are there any initial disclosures from the Plaintiffs or any 
certification that they served such disclosures. Plaintiffs' argument that they 
substantially complied with the court's order to provide initial disclosures is 
without merit. Not only did they fail to substantially comply with that order—they 
made no effort whatsoever to comply. Even when Defendant renewed his Motion 
to Dismiss a month after the court's order, Plaintiffs still did not produce initial 
disclosures. Instead, they merely referred Defendant to Plaintiffs' prior discovery 
responses, which were not initial disclosures and did not contain the required 
information. 
Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants failed to respond to Plaintiffs' 
discovery requests. Plaintiffs did not raise this issue in the court below and, 
therefore, cannot raise it now for the first time on appeal. Application of this well-
established rule of appellate procedure is particularly compelling in this case. This 
10 
is the first time that Defendant has heard that Plaintiffs claii > have served 
discovery requests. If Plaintiffs had followed the proper procedure in the court 
below, first attempting to confer in good faith with Defendant in an effort to secure 
Defendant's responses and then sending the certification letter required by Utah R. 
Civ. P. 37(a)(2)(B), Defendant would have been made aware of the discovery 
requests and would have responded to them. If Plaintiffs were dissatisfied with his 
responses, they could have filed a motion to compel under Rule 37(a)(2)(B), thus 
giving the lower court a chance to resolve the matter. Because Plaintiffs did not 
raise the issue below, they cannot do so now. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Trial Court Properly Exercised its Discretion to Dismiss This 
Case for Failure to Prosecute Where Plaintiffs Engaged in a Pattern 
of Delay by Refusing to Provide the Initial Disclosures Required by 
the Rules and the Directions of the Court. 
In PDC Consulting, this Court set forth the standard of review an appellate 
court should follow in reviewing a trial court's dismissal of a case for failure to 
prosecute: '"[We] do not disturb [a trial court's order of dismissal for failure to 
prosecute] absent an abuse of discretion and a likelihood that an injustice 
occurred."' 2008 UT App 372, f 5 (quoting Hartford leasing Corp. v. State, 888 
P.2d 694, 697 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)) (alteration in original); see also Charlie 
Brown Constr. Co. v. Leisure Sports Inc., 740 P. 2d 1368, 1370 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994) ("Dismissal for failure to prosecute is a decision within the broad discretion 
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of the trial court. This Court will not interfere with that decision unless it clearly 
appears that the court has abused its discretion and that there is a likelihood an 
injustice has been wrought."). The Court further explained that "it is well within a 
trial court's discretion to dismiss a case under rule 41(b) when 'a party fails to 
move forward according to the rules and the directions of the court, without 
justifiable excuse.'" PDC Consulting, 2008 UT App 372, f 5 (quoting 
Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor, Inc., 544 P.2d 876, 
879 (Utah 1975)) (citations omitted); see also Rohan v. Boseman, 2002 UT App 
109, % 28,46 P.3d 753 ("The party challenging the dismissal bears the burden of 
offering 'a reasonable excuse for [his or her] lack of diligence.'") (alteration in 
original) (citations omitted). 
The Court then set forth five factors Utah appellate courts should use to analyze 
whether a case was properly dismissed for failure to prosecute (the Westinghouse 
factors): 
(1) the conduct of both parties; (2) the opportunity each party has had 
to move the case forward; (3) what each party has done to move the 
case forward; (4) the amount of difficulty or prejudice that may have 
been caused to the other side; and (5) "most important, whether 
injustice may result from the dismissal." 
PDC Consulting, 2008 UT App 372, f 6 (quoting Meadow Fresh Farms, Inc. v. 
Utah State Univ. Dep't ofAgric. & Applied Set, 813 P.2d 1216,1219 (UtahCt. 
App. 1991)) (citation omitted). None of these factors is determinative but should 
be applied under "the totality of the circumstances." Id. \ 15. 
Plaintiffs let several months pass from the filing of their complaint without 
providing the initial disclosures required by Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1). (R. at 49,94-
98). Defendant, on the other hand, served his initial disclosures, as well as 
interrogatories, requests for production of documents, and requests for admission, 
just a month after filing his answer. (R. at 15-18). Defendant's counsel also wrote 
several letters to Plaintiffs' counsel requesting initial disclosures, •! avail. 
(R. at 33-34, 38-39, 41). Nevertheless, the trial court gave Plaintiffs another 
chance to produce their disclosures. In an August 24,2009, telephonic hearing, the 
court ordered Plaintiffs to provide initial disclosures within 10 days, stating that the 
court would dismiss the case if Plaintiffs did not comply. (R. at 49, 94-98). 
Plaintiffs' counsel agreed to supply the disclosures within that timeframe. Id. 
Despite that fact, Plaintiffs still did nol provide the disclosures, nor did they give 
any excuse whatsoever for their failure to do so. (R. at 53-57, 58-60). In flagrant 
disregard of the court's order, Plaintiffs delayed yet another month. Id. At that 
point, rather than producing the court-ordered disclosures, they merely referred 
Defendant to prior discovery responses, doing so only after Defendant renewed his 
motion to dismiss. Id. Three months later, Plaintiffs still had not provided their 
initial disclosures, and the trial court entered an order dismissing their case for 
failure to prosecute. (R. at 83-85). 
The first three Westinghouse factors, "the parties' conduct, what they had the 
opportunity to do, and what was actually done to move the case forward" support 
the lower court's decision to dismiss this case for failure to prosecute. PDC 
Consulting, 2008 UT App 372, \ 7. Plaintiffs had ample opportunity to provide the 
required Rule 26 initial disclosures but did not, even after the court ordered them to 
do so. They failed '"to move forward according to the rules and the directions of 
the court, without justifiable excuse.'" Id. f 5. Defendant, on the other hand, 
served his initial disclosures within a month of filing his answer, as well as making 
several attempts to get Plaintiffs to provide their initial disclosures. (R. at 17-18, 
33-34, 38-39,41, 57). Defendant also propounded discovery requests early in the 
case. (R. at 15-16).l 
The fourth Westinghouse factor, prejudice, also supports the lower court's 
decision to dismiss this case. Prejudice to the opposing party need not be 
overwhelming to warrant dismissal. PDC Consulting, 2008 UT App 372, f 12. 
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 Plaintiffs for the first time now claim that they served discovery requests on the 
Defendant and that he did not respond. As discussed in Section III., Plaintiffs 
cannot raise that issue for the first time on appeal. Further, even if Plaintiffs had 
served discovery requests, "nothing was done to compel discovery . . . . " PDC 
Consulting, 2008 UT App 372, f 10 n. 8; see also Charlie Brown, 740 P.2d 1368, 
1371 (Court based dismissal for failure to prosecute partly on eight-month period 
during which plaintiffs failed to follow up on their interrogatories and, therefore, 
did not realize that defendants had not received them.) 
Relevant considerations include increased costs and inconvenience to the opposing 
party. Rohan, 2002 UT App 109, %3l. In this case, the Defendant obviously was 
inconvenienced by Plaintiffs' repeated failure to provide initial disclosures despite 
Defendant's numerous requests for them. (R. at 33-34,38-39, 41, 57). Further, 
Defendant's counsel incurred additional costs in preparing and renewing a motion 
and memoranda related to Plaintiffs' delay. (R. at 23-44, 50-57, 80-82). 
With respect to the final Westinghouse factor, Plaintiffs argue that it would 
be unjust to leave them without a remedy for their claims. This Court rejected a 
similar argument in PDC Consulting, concluding that the plaintiff'"had more Mian 
ample opportunity'" to pursue its claims but failed to do so. PDC Consulting, 
2008 UT App 372,113 (citations omitted). Although the PDC plaintiff had more 
time to pursue its claims than Plaintiffs did in this case, Plaintiffs certainly had 
adequate time to serve their initial disclosures, one of the first documents required 
in a lawsuit, and to take other steps to move their case forward but did not do so. 
In determining that dismissal can be upheld despite a finding of possible 
injustice, this Court stated in Rohan: "'[E]ven where a trial court finds facts 
indicating that "injustice could result from the dismissal of [a] case," it can dismiss 
when a plaintiff has "had more than ample opportunity to prove his [or her] 
asserted interest and simply failed to do so.'"" 2002 UT App 109, f 28 (quoting 
Country Meadows Convalescent Ctr. v. Utah Dep't of Health, 8^ 1 P.2d 1212, 1215 
is 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993)) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). The Court 
affirmed dismissal despite the fact that the plaintiff, who had received a closed 
head injury in an auto accident, was left without a remedy. The Court determined 
that in the two years between filing his case and dismissal, the plaintiff "'had 
ample opportunity to litigate [his] case . . . but abused such opportunity,...'" Id. \ 
32 (citation omitted) (alteration in original). Likewise, Plaintiffs had ample 
opportunity to litigate their claims in this case but abused that opportunity, thus 
warranting dismissal. The trial court properly exercised its broad discretion in 
dismissing Plaintiffs' case. 
II. The Trial Court Correctly Found That Plaintiffs Did Not Provide 
the Initial Disclosures Required by Rule 26 and Court Order. 
Encompassed within the lower court's dismissal order was a finding that 
Plaintiffs failed to provide initial disclosures. This Court must uphold that finding 
unless it was clearly erroneous. Chen, 2004 UT 82, \ 19/ In their brief, Plaintiffs 
claim to have served initial disclosures a few weeks after the lower court ordered 
them to do so, and the index to their addendum lists initial disclosures as the 
2
 The Utah Supreme Court stated that "[i]n order to establish that a particular 
finding of fact is clearly erroneous, '[a]n appellant must marshal the evidence in 
support of the findings and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial 
court's findings are so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the 
evidence.' . . . If the evidence is inadequately marshaled, this court assumes that 
all findings are adequately supported by the evidence." Chen, 2004 UT 82, ^[19; 
accord Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9); Rohan, 2002 UT App 109, f 35. Plaintiffs have 
not even attempted to marshal the evidence in support of the lower court's finding. 
Therefore, that finding must be upheld. 
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second item. (Brief of Appellant at 9, 11, 16). However, there are no initial 
disclosures from the Plaintiff anywhere in that addendum or in the entire Record. 
Neither is there any certification that Plaintiffs served such disclosures. Instead, 
the item in Plaintiffs' addendum labeled as "Initial Disclosures" is a copy of 
Plaintiffs' unsigned responses to Defendant's prior discovery requests. 
(Appellant's Brief, Addendum, Item 2). 
Plaintiffs' argument that they substantially complied with the court's order 
to provide initial disclosures is without merit. Not only did they fail to 
substantially comply with that order—they made no effort whatsoever to comply. 
All they had to do was prepare initial disclosures, but they did not do so. Even 
when Defendant renewed his Motion to Dismiss a month after the court's order, 
Plaintiffs still did not prepare initial disclosures. Instead, they merely referred 
Defendant to Plaintiffs' prior discovery responses, which were not initial 
disclosures and d: • + contain the required information. (R. at 58-78). 
Apparently, Plaintiffs claim that their prior discovery responses were the 
substantial equivalent of initial disclosures because they contained some of the 
information required by Rule 26(a)(1). The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
however, do not contemplate a "substantial equivalency" test for initial disclosures. 
Rule 26(a) categorizes the disclosures described therein as "required" and directs 
that parties "shall" provide them. Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1). If parties could escape 
Rule 26(a)(l)'s initial disclosure requirement by filing discovery responses, that 
section of the rule would be obliterated. In Calkins v. Pacel Corp., 2008 WL 
2311565 (W.D. Va. June 4, 2008), the court rejected the parties' argument that 
they need not produce initial disclosures because the same information was 
included in their discovery responses. The court stated 
[T]he fact that such information was provided only in response to an 
interrogatory or request for production undermines the very purpose 
of required initial disclosures.... "A major purpose of the [1993] 
revision is to accelerate the exchange of basic information . . . and to 
eliminate the paper work involved in requesting such information.... 
[Initial disclosures are] the functional equivalent of court-ordered 
interrogatories." 
Id. at *3 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 26, Advisory Committee Notes (1993)) 
(alterations in original). Like the non-complying parties in Calkins, Plaintiffs' 
attitude "has been one of cavalier indifference toward their [disclosure] 
obligations." Id. at *7. 
Moreover, Plaintiffs' discovery responses do not contain all of the required 
information. In their brief, Plaintiffs compare the disclosures required by Rule 
26(a)(1) to their discovery responses. (Appellants' Brief at 10). With respect to 
the information required by Rule 26(a)(1)(A) regarding individuals likely to have 
discoverable information, Plaintiffs refer to their answers to Interrogatories 1,10, 
and 25. Their responses to Interrogatories 1 and 10, however, do not identify the 
required subjects of which the individuals have knowledge. (R. at 62-66). 
Moreover, their response to Interrogatory No. 25 does not even list names, let 
alone subject matter. Id. Further, none of the interrogatory responses cited even 
list Plaintiff Kathy Slaughter or describe the subject of her knowledge. Neither do 
Plaintiffs' written responses to Defendant's document requests satisfy the 
requirements of Rule 26(a)(1)(B) to provide a copy of, or description by category 
and location of, all discoverable documents. Several of the responses state that 
Plaintiffs are still searching for records, or direct the Defendant to the non-existent 
initial disclosures. (R. at 67-69, Responses 1, 2, 4, 9, 10, 13, and 19). Even if a 
"substantial equivalency" test applied, which it does not, Plaintiffs' discovery 
responses are not the substantial equivalent of initial disclosures. 
This Court should uphold the lower court's finding that Plaintiffs failed to 
provide initial disclosures. 
Plaintiffs Cannot Raise for the First Time on Appeal the Issue of 
Defendant's Purported Failure to Respond to Discovery Requests. 
Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants failed to respond to Plaintiffs' 
discovery requests. Plaintiffs did not raise this issue in the court below and, 
therefore, cannot raise it now for the first time on appeal. Brookside, 2002 UT 48, 
Tj 14. As stated by the Utah Supreme Court, "in order to preserve an issue for 
3
 In their Brief, Plaintiffs mistakenly claim that the "harmless error" standard set 
forth in State v. Evans, 2001 UT 22,20 P.3d 888 applies here. That case, however, 
involved the standard of review of a trial court's actions in an attempted murder 
trial. Plaintiffs also incorrectly cite Utah R. Civ. P. 8, which applies to pleadings, 
not initial disclosures. 
1Q 
appeal the issue must be presented to the trial court in such a way that the trial 
court has an opportunity to rule on that issue." Id. (citing Badger v. Brooklyn 
Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998)). Plaintiffs did not do so, as evidenced 
by their failure in their brief to provide the required "citation to the record showing 
that the issue was preserved in the trial court;..." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5)(A).4 
As a result, Plaintiffs cannot pursue the issue before this Court. 
Application of this well-established rule of appellate procedure is 
particularly compelling in this case. This is the first time Defendant has heard that 
Plaintiffs claim to have served discovery requests. If Plaintiffs had followed the 
proper procedure in the court below, first attempting to confer in good faith with 
Defendant in an effort to secure Defendant's responses and then sending the 
certification letter required by Utah R. Civ. P. 37(a)(2)(B), Defendant would have 
4
 The only related item in the Record is a certificate of mailing filed on March 16, 
2009, which states that a copy of Plaintiffs' Discovery Requests was served on 
Defendant's counsel. (R. at 21). Filing a certificate of service, however, is not the 
same as raising the issue of a party's failure to respond to discovery requests. 
'"[T]he issue must be specifically raised'" in the court below. Brookside, 2002 UT 
48, Tj 14 (quoting Badger, 944 P.2d at 847). Moreover, it is debatable whether the 
alleged discovery requests ever existed. Plaintiffs did not attach a copy of those 
requests to their brief. In addition, both prior to and during this appeal, Plaintiffs 
referred to the subject certificate of mailing as proof that Plaintiffs had responded 
to Defendant's discovery requests. (R. at 61; Appellant's Brief, Addendum, Item 
2). (In both instances, the certificate is attached to Plaintiffs' unsigned discovery 
responses, not requests). It appears that through a typographical error, the 
certificate mistakenly referred to Plaintiffs Discovery Requests, when it should 
have referred to Plaintiffs Discovery Responses. Because this issue is not 
properly before this Court, however, no determination need be made thereon. 
been made aware of the discovery requests and would have responded to them. If 
Plaintiffs were dissatisfied with his responses, they could have filed a motion to 
compel under Rule 37(a)(2)(B), thus giving the lower court a chance to resolve the 
matter. Because Plaintiffs did not raise the issue below, they cannot do so now. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant/Appellee Leo Anderson DBA Complete Landscape and Sprinkler 
respectfully requests the Court to affirm the lower court's order dismissing the case 
below with prejudice for failure to prosecute. 
DATED: July J O _ , 2010 PETERSEN & ASSOCIATES 
BY: (UM 
JAN ALFRED, 
Attorney for Defendant, 
LEO ANDERSON DBA COMPLETE 
LANDSCAPE AND SPRINKLER 
5
 In connection with their claim that Defendant did not respond to discovery 
requests, Plaintiffs make serious accusations of bad faith without any citations to 
the Record. Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) is designed to prevent such spurious claims 
by requiring the argument itself to contain citations to the portions of the record 
upon which the party relies. Further, the cases upon which Plaintiffs rely to 
support their bad faith claim are inapplicable. Those cases pertain to an insured 
bringing a bad faith claim against its insurer. See Campbell v. State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co., 840 P.2d 130 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
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I certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee 
were mailed, postage prepaid, on July QS> , 2010, to the following: 
Alvin R. Lundgren 
5015 West Old Highway, #200 
Mountain Green, UT 84050 
and that an original and seven copies were hand delivered to the Clerk of the Utah 
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ADDENDUM 
Attached are: 
1. Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) and (2) 
2. Transcript of August 24, 2009 Telephonic Hearing and Order 
Rule 26. General Provisions Governing Discovery 
(a) Required disclosures; Discovery methods. 
(a)(1) Initial disclosures. Except in cases exempt under subdivision (a)(2) 
and except as otherwise stipulated or directed by order, a party shall, 
without awaiting a discovery request, provide to other parties: 
(a)(1)(A) the name and, if known, the address and telephone number of 
each individual likely to have discoverable information supporting its 
claims or defenses, unless solely for impeachment, identifying the 
subjects of the information; 
(a)(1)(B) a copy of, or a description by category and location of, all 
discoverable documents, data compilations, electronically stored 
information, and tangible things in the possession, custody, or control of 
the party supporting its claims or defenses, unless solely for 
impeachment; 
(a)(1)(C) a computation of any category of damages claimed by the 
disclosing party, making available for inspection and copying under Rule 
34 all discoverable documents or other evidentiary material on which 
such computation is based, including materials bearing on the nature and 
extent of injuries suffered; and 
(a)(1)(D) for inspection and copying as under Rule 34 any insurance 
agreement under which any person carrying on an insurance business 
may be liable to satisfy part or all of a judgment which may be entered in 
the case or to indemnify or reimburse for payments made to satisfy the 
judgment. 
Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, the 
disclosures required by subdivision (a)(1) shall be made within 14 days 
after the meeting of the parties under subdivision (f). Unless otherwise 
stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, a party joined after the 
meeting of the parties shall make these disclosures within 30 days after 
being served. A party shall make initial disclosures based on the 
information then reasonably available and is not excused from making 
disclosures because the party has not fully completed the investigation of 
the case or because the party challenges the sufficiency of another party's 
disclosures or because another party has not made disclosures. 
(a)(2) Exemptions. 
(a)(2)(A) The requirements of subdivision (a)(1) and subdivision (f) do 
not apple to actions: 
(a)(2)(A)(i) based on a contract in which the amount demanded in the 
pleadings is $20,000 or less; 
(a)(2)(A)(ii) for judicial review of adjudicative proceedings or rule 
making proceedings of an administrative agency; 
(a)(2)(A)(iii) governed by Rule 65B or Rule 65C; 
(a)(2)(A)(iv) to enforce an arbitration award; 
(a)(2)(A)(v) for water rights general adjudication under Title 73, Chapter 
4; and 
(a)(2)(A)(vi) in which any party not admitted to practice law in Utah is 
not represented by counsel. 
(a)(2)(B) In an exempt action, the matters subject to disclosure under 
subpart (a)(1) are subject to discovery under subpart (b). 
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1 BOUNTIFUL, UTAH; AUGUST 24, 2009 
2 JUDGE GLEN R. DAWSON 
3 (Transcriber's note: speaker identification 
4 may not be accurate with audio recordings.) 
5 TELEPHONIC PROCEEDINGS 
6 THE COURT: Hello counsel. We are on the phone and 
7 on the record in case 080700512, set today for a hearing on 
8 the motion to dismiss by the defendants. Will counsel please 
9 note their appearance for the record? 
10 MR. LUNDGREN: Alvin Lundgren for Jay Slaughter and 
11 Kathy Slaughter, plaintiffs. 
12 MR. LUND: David Lund for the defendant. 
13 THE COURT: Counsel, I've read everything that 
14 you've filed. I'll give you a chance to address me but 
15 here's where I am. Let me throw it out at the beginning. My 
16 inclination is to enter an order that plaintiff make initial 
17 disclosures within 10 days. The plaintiff provide the court 
18 an agreed upon - with assistance from the defendants, of 
19 course - attorney planning report within 20 days. If I don't 
20 have those on those dates the case will be dismissed. So I'm 
21 basically going to reserve on the motion pending completion 
22 of those two items. That's my inclination. 
23 Mr. Lund, you can address me first. 
24 MR. LUND: That sounds completely reasonable to me, 
25 Your Honor. I'm just trying to get this moved along. 
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MR. LUND: Advise the court? 
THE COURT: Advise the court with a copy to Mr. 
Lundgren and I'll do a ruling at that point in time. 
MR. LUND: Will do, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right, counsel. Thank you for your 
time. 
MR. LUND: Thank you, Your Honor. 
MR. LUNDGREN: Thank you, Your Honor. 
(Whereupon the hearing was concluded) 
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